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This paper examines the demand for broad money in 
Japan from 1975 to 1994. In spite of the large shocks 
resulting from financial liberalization and the subsequent
“boom and bust” of the “bubble” economy, the paper confirms
that a stable money demand function can still be set up by
taking proper account of financial liberalization and the
wealth effect, and by adopting an adequate econometric
strategy. In addition, a super exogeneity test is conducted, and
its implication is considered in the context of the monetary
transmission mechanism.
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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1998I. Introduction
A stable money demand function is thought to be essential for monetary policy,
because it is supposed to play a key role in enabling the monetary authorities to set an
intermediate target, money supply, consistent with final targets such as the inflation rate
and/or real income. Because of its importance in macroeconomic policy, a large
amount of research has been conducted on this topic (see Judd and Scadding [1982],
Goldfeld and Sichel [1990], and Laidler [1993] for extensive surveys). Thisis true in Japan
as well. Recent work mainly concerns the question of whether financial liberalization and
the subsequent “boom and bust” of the “bubble” economy make the money demand
function in Japan unstable. This paper shows that a stable money demand function can
still be set up by taking proper account of financial liberalization and the wealth
effect, and by adopting an adequate econometric modeling strategy.
In particular, the paper confirms the role of wealth in a Japanese broad money
demand function. In fact, in the literature on the demand for money, the wealth
effect itself is an old issue and we can find it in such classical papers as Goldfeld
(1976) and Friedman (1978). Here, the effect is carefully examined by using a
definition of wealth that includes not only financial assets but also nonfinancial
assets, and adding it to income as a second scaling variable.
On the other hand, for its methodology, the paper exploits the “general-to-
simple” approach. That is, it derives a single equation of the demand for broad
money from a sequential reduction of a general model of system equations. The
technique of cointegration analysis is employed and the validity of the model is
finally checked by a super exogeneity test. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly summarizes empirical
research into Japanese money demand functions, and refers to financial liberalization
and the “bubble” economy as the background of these works. Section III explains the
data set. Section IV describes the sequence of investigations and the result of seeking
a stable money demand function. A super exogeneity test is conducted. Section V
concludes the paper. 
II. Financial Liberalization and the “Bubble” Economy
There are a number of studies concerning money demand in Japan, but most of
them—and particularly the early works, such as that of Tsutsui and Hatanaka
(1982), and the excellent survey of Tsutsui (1986)—are only available in Japanese.
Apart from the studies cited below, Hamada and Hayashi (1985) and Ishida (1984)
are available in English.
First, concerning the demand for narrow money (M1),
1 Tsutsui and Hatanaka
(1982) suggested the possibility of “missing money” from 1980 by applying a 
partial adjustment model on the lines that Goldfeld (1973, 1976) used for U.S.
money demand. Afterward, this was confirmed by Rasche (1990), who used a vector
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1. The definitions of money used in Japan are summarized in the next section.autoregression (VAR) including an error correction term and a dummy variable that
was set to unity from 1982.
On the other hand, concerning the demand for broad money (M2+CDs), it was
generally believed that a partial adjustment model could trace the actual development
of data satisfactorily up to the mid-1980s. In 1985, money market certificates
(MMCs) and large time deposits were introduced,
2 and the financial market in Japan
was liberalized rapidly. Moreover, the “bubble” boom followed. It reached its peak
around the end of 1989 and burst after that. Considering this large shock to Japan’s
economy, some researchers suggested that there might be a shift in the money
demand function (Bank of Japan [1988, 1992], Suzuki [1989], and Yoshida and
Rasche [1990]). However, other researchers such as Ueda (1988), Corker (1989),
Shiba (1989), Yoshida (1990), Arize and Shwiff (1993), Baba (1995), and Ishida and
Shirakawa (1996) (the latter two studies are available only in Japanese) showed that
the money demand function remained stable.
As seen above, financial liberalization and the “bubble” economy are the
background to recent discussions of broad money demand. First, let us consider
financial liberalization in Japan.
3 Apart from McKenzie (1992), who examined the
impact of the amendment of the Foreign Exchange Law in 1980, the above authors
are mainly concerned with the effect of domestic financial liberalization. Even
though market-determined deposit interest rates were first introduced for CDs in
1979, it is widely believed that the introduction of MMCs and large time deposits in
1985 had a greater impact on the Japanese financial market. This is because initially
the issue of CDs was highly regulated in the form of a minimum deposit requirement 
(¥500 million) and a maximum limit for a bank (10 percent of its capital). More or
less similar regulations were imposed on MMCs and large time deposits at the outset,
but they were relaxed—the deregulation of time deposit interest rates was completed
in 1993. The deregulation of demand deposit interest rates was completed in 1994.
On the other hand, partly because of the extremely low level of interest rates after the
Plaza Accord of September 1985, the prices of existing assets such as land and stocks
increased significantly. It is thought that banks in Japan were able to lend more
money to companies and investors by using such assets as highly appreciated collateral.
This money was invested not only in the newly liberalized deposits, but also again in land
and stocks, increasing their prices. The value of collateral then increased and the financial
sector lent more money to the nonfinancial sector, and so on. This circle—the “bubble”
economy—became particularly noticeable after 1987. The bubble reached its peak
around the end of 1989 and “burst” after the Bank of Japan tightened monetary policy and
the Ministry of Finance restrained bank lending for land purchasing. Since the bubble burst,
the circle has gone in the opposite direction. That is, banks have been able to lend less and
less money as the value of collateral has decreased following a drop in asset prices. 
These episodes suggest that we should be extremely careful about the impact of
financial liberalization and the wealth effect when we model the demand for money
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2. MMCs had interest rates that followed those of CDs, and their minimum deposits (initially, ¥50 million) were smaller
than those of large time deposits (initially, ¥1 billion). Eventually, MMCs were absorbed by large time deposits because
of the subsequent reductions of the latter’s minimum deposits (e.g., ¥3 million from November 1991). 
3. The details of financial liberalization in Japan can be found in Nakao and Horii (1991).in Japan. Most researchers have incorporated the impact of financial liberalization by
taking into account the liberalized interest rates. This paper follows this line. On the
other hand, only Ueda (1988), Corker (1989), Bank of Japan (1992), Arize and
Shwiff (1993), Baba (1995), and Ishida and Shirakawa (1996) have examined the
wealth effect. Baba claimed that his money demand function violated the exogeneity
condition with respect to wealth. As we will see below, the definition of wealth
employed by these studies did not have enough coverage, and hence this paper will
use more comprehensive wealth data. 
III. Data Description
A. Money
The definitions of money in Japan are as follows:
[1] M1 = cash currency + demand deposits;
[2] M2+CDs = M1 + time deposits + certificates of deposit; and
[3] broad liquidity = M2+CDs + deposits (including CDs) of post offices, agricul-
tural cooperatives, etc., + money trusts and loan trusts of domestically licensed
banks (excluding foreign trust banks) + bonds with repurchase agreement +
bank debentures + government bonds + investment trusts + money deposited
other than money in trust + foreign bonds.
Most researchers have estimated M2+CDs demand as broad money demand
partly because broad liquidity data are only available from 1980. M1 and M2+CDs
data are available from 1955 on end-of-month bases, and from 1963 (M1) and 1967
(M2+CDs) on daily average bases. In this paper, the three-month average of end-
of-month M2+CDs is used because the wealth data that will be discussed below are
end-of-quarter based and the end-of-month M2+CDs data are more consistent with
this scale variable.
Figure 1 shows the annual change in real balance of M2+CDs deflated by the
GDP deflator. There seems to be a regime shift in the series around 1973 that reflects
the transition from a high-growth to a stable-growth era in Japan’s economy. After
the “bubble” economy, it plunged into negative growth in 1992, then recovered
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Figure 1  Annual Growth of Real Balance and Annual Inflationsomewhat. Subsequently, it continued to show moderate growth until 1996. As seen
above, some researchers have argued that this swing in the series came from a shift in
the money demand.
B. Scale Variables
In the literature on money demand functions, income or wealth is often chosen as
the scale variable (see Judd and Scadding [1982] and Goldfeld and Sichel [1990], for
example). The portfolio approach developed by Tobin (1969) says that both income
and wealth play an important role in the demand for money. Since we are modeling
the demand for broad money, the portfolio theory is likely to hold. Moreover, money
is likely to be used for transactions of asset dealing such as purchasing land or
equities. Considering the bubble episode, we should take into account not only the
conventional measure of transactions—income—but also wealth all the more.
However, the wealth data seem problematic. Conceptually, there is no reason why
we should restrict ourselves to financial assets. The importance of including physical
wealth in consumption functions is pointed out by Muellbauer (1991). This is the
case with money demand functions as well. In fact, Corker (1989), Bank of Japan
(1992), Arize and Shwiff (1993), Baba (1995), and Ishida and Shirakawa (1996)
used financial assets held by personal and nonfinancial corporate sectors in Flow of
Funds (FOF) data when they investigated the wealth effect in their money demand
functions. On the other hand, the System of National Accounts (SNA)-based
definition of wealth, which covers not only financial assets but also nonfinancial
assets such as land, housing, inventories, and so on, is more promising. The major
drawback is that it is only available on an annual basis. This paper tries to solve the
problem by interpolating it into a quarterly series. The procedure of the interpolation
is summarized in the Appendix. Since wealth contains money as its component, the
M2+CDs balance is subtracted from the wealth data.
4 The resulting data, which are
deflated by the GDP deflator, are shown in Figure 2, together with real GDP, and the
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Figure 2  Annual Growth of Real Income and Real Wealth
4. At the end of 1995, M2+CDs amounts to nearly 40 percent of FOF financial assets held by personal and non-
financial corporate sectors. This large proportion could be the reason why the exogeneity condition did not hold
in Baba (1995).wealth-income ratio can be found in Figure 3.
40 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1998
C. Opportunity Costs
In order to take into account the opportunity costs, two interest rates, that is, the
interest rate of money itself (hereafter, the own interest rate) and the return on rival
assets, are considered.
First, the own interest rate. One of the keys to success in modeling the demand
for narrow money in the United Kingdom and the United States by Hendry and
Ericsson (1991) and Baba, Hendry, and Starr (1992) is modeling the effect of finan-
cial liberalization by introducing the “learning-adjusted” interest rate. This paper will
imitate them by weighting the corresponding interest rates. That is, the own interest
rate is calculated as
(The own interest rate)t = wm1t • (regulated time deposit interest rate)t
+ wm2t • (free time deposit interest rate)t
+ wm3t • (CD rate)t, 
where wm1t, . . . , wm3t are the calculated shares of each deposit. 
Next, the interest rate on rival assets. Possible candidates are interest rates on
assets that are included in broad liquidity but not in M2+CDs. That is, the rival rate
is calculated as the maximum return on the following assets:
[1] three-month gensaki (bonds with repurchase agreement);
[2] five-year money trusts;
[3] five-year loan trusts;
[4] five-year bank debentures (subscription market rates, yields to subscribers);
[5] five-year bank debentures (secondary market rates, over-the-counter standard
bond quotation); and
[6] five-year postal savings
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Figure 3  Money Velocity and the Wealth-Income Ratio
5. The five-year rate was calculated as the compound interest rate from the corresponding uncompound (single)
interest rate.Other than these assets, which are characterized by broad liquidity, the return on
stock could also be included. However, a preliminary investigation showed that the
coefficients on the stock return were positive since the return is dominated by the
wealth effect or the transaction effect. For this reason, the paper does not include the
stock return as a rival interest rate.
In Figure 4, the own interest rate and the rival interest rate are plotted together
with the spread between them.
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Figure 4  Interest Rates
Table 1  ADF Statistics for Testing a Unit Root
Variables t-adf Lag Additional regressor
m –1.92 4 Constant 
p –2.89 2 Constant
y –1.66 4 Constant, trend
w –2.71 4 Constant, trend
Rm –3.86* 3 Constant, trend
Rr –3.52* 4 Constant, trend
m – p –2.08 3 Constant, trend
∆ p –4.41** 1 Constant, trend
Notes: 1. The estimation periods are 1976/III–1994/IV.
2. t-adf denotes the t-value of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistics. The critical values are based on
response surface in MacKinnon (1991). Lag denotes its lag order.
3. Here and elsewhere in the paper, * and ** denote rejection at the 5 percent and 1 percent critical values.
4. Lowercase letters denote logarithms of the corresponding variables, and ∆denotes a difference operator.
6. All calculations in this paper, except otherwise noted, are conducted by PcGive 9.0 (Doornik and Hendry [1996])
or PcFiml 9.0 (Doornik and Hendry [1997]).
D. Time Properties of the Series
Before going into modeling the demand for money, the time property of each series
is checked by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) (Table 1).
6 The procedure to
determine the inclusion of deterministic terms and lag length is as follows (see
Banerjee et al. [1993] for a rationale of the procedure). First, check the significance 
of a constant and a trend by the conventional student-t distribution. If the trend is
significant, then retain these variables and check the significance of lagged terms by
the conventional student-t distribution, where the lag length is originally set at five.
Then determine the lag length as the highest lag that is significant within five lags. In the case where the trend is not significant, drop the trend and test the significance
of the constant term. If it is significant, then retain it in the ADF regression and
determine the lag length just mentioned. Otherwise, drop the constant term from the
regression and determine the lag length.
Sample periods for estimation are after 1975, that is, after a regime shift from a
high-growth to a stable-growth era in Japan. These sample periods are chosen
because, as is well known, the ADF test has low power in the presence of regime
shifts and we should pay more attention to this problem in the case of Japan, where a
regime shift is apparent—see Soejima (1995), for example.
Test results show that all the variables except two interest rates and the inflation
rate do not reject the null hypotheses that they have unit roots. However, it seems
safe to treat interest rates, whose unit roots are rejected at only the 5 percent signifi-
cance level, as I(1) variables since these t-adf become insignificant if the constant 
and the trend are dropped from the regression, whereas that of the inflation rate is
significant even in such a case.
IV. Modeling the Demand for Money
Using the data discussed above, we proceed to model a Japanese money demand
function. The modeling strategy followed in this paper is the “general-to-simple”
approach (Hendry and Ericsson [1991], Baba, Hendry, and Starr [1992], Ericsson
and Sharma [1996], etc.). Summarizing the procedure, first a system analysis of
cointegration is conducted and exogeneity status with respect to long-run parameters
is checked. Then, we proceed to a single equation analysis. In this framework, the
long-run solution is examined again by an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL)
model and is compared to the cointegrating vector in the above system analysis. After
confirming an error correction term, the model is reduced so that it becomes parsi-
monious. Various tests, particularly those concerning stability, are conducted. Finally,
a test for super exogeneity follows.
A. System Analysis of Cointegration
First, an error correction term is found as a cointegration relationship. Following the
approach cited above, we will try a Johansen test (Johansen [1988], Johansen and
Juselius [1990]), since its VAR approach is the most general model. We start with a
six-variate VAR that involves M2+CDs, mt; price, pt; income, yt; wealth other than
M2+CDs, wt; the own interest rate, Rmt; and the rival interest rate, Rrt.
7 Four lags are
taken for each variable, and a trend,
8 a constant, and a second oil crisis dummy—
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7. Lowercase letters denote logarithms of the corresponding variables.
8. A deterministic time trend is included for the following statistical reason. When variables in a cointegrating vector
have deterministic time trends and these trends are linearly independent with coefficients that bring a linear
combination of stochastic components of the variables (i.e., the case of stochastic cointegration; see Ogaki [1993]
for further explanation, and also see Soejima [1996] for critics on the existing money demand functions from the
viewpoint of stochastic cointegration), a cointegrating vector should also contain a deterministic time trend in
order to absorb the linear independence among the deterministic time trends. For this reason, we had better check
the significance of a deterministic time trend in our model.which takes a value of unity at 1980/II, nought otherwise—are included. The sample
period is from 1975/I to 1994/IV.
The performance of the VAR is shown in Table 2 [1]. AR represents Lagrange-
multiplier tests for the fifth-order autocorrelated residuals of each variable [~ F
(5, 48)] and the system as a whole [~ F(180, 114)]. Normality represents 
the Doornik-Hansen normality tests for each variable [~ c2(2)] and the system 
[~ c2(12)].  ARCH is a test for the fourth-order autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity [~ F(4, 45)]. Xi
2 represents the White heteroscedasticity tests for
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Table 2  System Analysis of Cointegration
[1] Properties of VAR residuals
m p w y Rm Rr Vector
AR 2.22 2.33 0.27 0.76 1.83 0.77 1.70**
Normality 1.90 1.44 0.97 2.13 2.16 1.52 10.18
ARCH 0.69 0.51 0.57 0.96 0.97 0.42 —
Xi
2 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.06 1,063
[2] Tests for the number of cointegrating vectors
Eigenvalues 0.423 0.392 0.302 0.193 0.150 0.061
Hypotheses r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 r ≤ 4 r ≤ 5
lmax 44.0* 39.8* 28.8 17.2 13.0 5.1
ltrace 147.9** 103.9** 64.1* 35.3 18.1 15.1
[3] Standardized adjustment coefficients a
m –0.30 0.14 0.03 0.007 –0.12 0.02 
p –0.06 –0.30 0.003 0.004 –0.08 0.05
y –0.13 0.08 –0.05 0.012 0.25 –0.03
w –0.03 0.08 0.005 0.009 –0.54 –0.22
Rm 0.02 0.11 –0.01 0.002 –0.15 0.03
Rr –0.13 0.06 –0.05 –0.006 –0.16 0.04
[4] Standardized eigenvectors b'
m p y w Rm Rr Trend
1.00 –0.91 –0.62 –0.35 –3.33 3.84 –0.0017
–0.92 1.00 0.48 0.40 0.84 –1.86 0.0011
–3.41 2.85 1.00 1.31 3.41 –0.70 0.0212
6.96 –5.47 –12.52 1.00 –14.68 8.84 –0.0228
–0.03 0.06 –0.12 0.04 1.00 –0.76 0.0005
0.16 –0.36 0.18 –0.02 –0.97 1.00 –0.0022
[5] Weak exogeneity tests for long-run parameter
m p w y Rm Rr
c2(1) 9.89** 1.01 1.02 1.09 1.01 1.25
Notes: 1. The vector autoregression model includes four lags on each variable (m, p, y, w, Rm, Rr ), a
trend, a constant, and the second oil crisis dummy ID80/II. The estimation period is
1975/I–1994/IV. The trend is restricted so that it lies in the cointegration space. The VAR
model can be reexpressed as a vector error correction model:
DXt = ab'X*
t–1 +SGiDXt–i + Fdt + et,
i
where Xt is (mt, pt, yt, wt, Rmt, Rrt), Xt* is (Xt, trend) and dt is deterministic components
other than the trend.
2. The  statistics  lmax and  ltrace are Johansen’s maximal eigenvalue and trace eigenvalue
statistics for testing cointegration.
3. The weak exogeneity test statistics are evaluated under the assumption that r = 2, m is
homogeneous with respect to p in the long run, and the second cointegrating vector has no
feedback effect on m. Its asymptotic distribution is c2(1), except that for m, which is c2(2).each variable [~ F(50, 2)] and the system [~ c2(1050)]. See Doornik and Hendry
(1996, 1997) for details of these tests. They reveal that each equation is reasonably
congruent. However, the system as a whole shows a sign of residual autocorrelation.
This could undermine the validity of the following system analysis, but with this
caveat, we proceed to the next step.
Table 2 [2] is the test for the number of cointegrating vectors. From this, we may
conclude that there are two, possibly three, cointegration relationships in this VAR
model. This is because, based on the maximum eigenvalue test, the hypothesis of one
cointegrating vector is rejected at the 5 percent significance level, but that of two
cointegrating vectors cannot be rejected. Meanwhile, the trace test leads us to accept
three cointegrating vectors. Below, some tests are based on the assumption of two
cointegrating vectors, but the final outcome does not change even if we assume that
there are three cointegrating vectors.
From the adjustment coefficients in Table 2 [3], it seems quite likely that the
second and possibly the third cointegrating vector are not relevant for the money
equation. That is, the first cointegrating vector goes into the money equation with a
feedback parameter of –0.30, while the second and the third cointegrating vector
have feedback coefficients of 0.14 and 0.03, which are less significantly different
from nought.
9 Then, if we concentrate on the first eigenvector in Table 2 [4], the
coefficient on p is –0.91 and the long-run homogeneity with respect to p seems to
hold. These intuitions are formally checked by the restriction test on a and b' and
accepted [1.01 ~ c2(1)]. On the other hand, the test of equality in absolute values
between Rm and Rr in the first eigenvector is rejected [6.6 ~ c2(1)].
10
Furthermore, assuming that m is homogeneous with respect to p in the long run
and the second cointegrating vector has no feedback effect on m, we test whether the
first cointegrating vector has a feedback effect on variables other than money. As
Johansen (1992) shows, these tests correspond to weak exogeneity tests for the long-
run parameter and such a condition is indispensable for a single equation analysis of
an error correction model.
11 As Table 2 [5] shows, this condition seems to hold since
zero coefficients on a of the first cointegrating vector into the other variables cannot
be rejected. Moreover, the test statistics of jointly setting zero restrictions on these
coefficients is accepted [10.93 ~ c2(5)].
Finally, maintaining these restrictions, the first cointegrating vector becomes
m – p = 0.42y + 0.42w + 2.37Rm – 2.99Rr + 0.002trend, (1)
and the adjustment coefficient for money is –0.50 with a standard error of 0.09.
B. Single Equation Analysis
In order to investigate the cointegration relationship further, an ADL model is estimated
as a general model in the single equation analysis. From the above system analysis, we can
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9. Of course this is a subjective judgment, but it is formally tested as we will see.
10. This might result from different treatment of the two interest rates; the own interest rate is calculated as the
average of the deposit rates, while the rival interest rate is calculated as the maximum of the rival assets’ rates.
11. The concept of weak exogeneity is summarized, together with that of super exogeneity, in Section IV.C below.safely assume the long-run homogeneity with respect to p, and hence regress (m – p)t on
the other five variables (yt, wt, Dpt, Rmt, Rrt) plus a constant and a trend.
12 Other
than Dpt, which includes only three lags, four lags are taken for each variable. Table 3 is
the outcome of the estimation. Other than those referred to in the Johansen test,
RESET is a test for functional form. There is no sign of a violation of these diagnostic
checks. The solved static long-run solution is
(m – p)t = 0.42yt + 0.42wt + 2.37Rmt – 3.03Rrt + 0.002trend, (2)
(0.12)    (0.04)     (0.48)       (0.47)      (0.001)
which surprisingly resembles the first cointegrating vector (equation [1]) in the
Johansen test. These equations suggest that the long-run elasticity with respect to
income is around 0.4. In Japanese broad money demand functions, Yoshida and
Rasche (1990) find that the long-run income elasticity is 1.2 according to a Johansen
test. Further, Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) estimate the income elasticity at 1.2 to 1.4
by cross-sectional regressions using data for Japanese prefectures (M2 minus cash).
Looking at the above regression, one may infer that such large elasticity beyond unity
might result from the omission of an important scale variable, i.e., wealth.
In addition, the stability of the estimated cointegration relationship is tested by
the procedure developed by Hansen (1992). Although his fully modified (FM)
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12. D denotes a difference operator.





–1.000 0.565 –0.025 0.060 –0.099 –0.499
— (0.142) (0.150) (0.153) (0.112) (0.122)
y
–0.015 0.159 0.037 –0.101 0.129 0.209 
(0.112) (0.127) (0.125) (0.120) (0.104) (0.095)
w
0.066 0.153 –0.022 –0.037 0.049 0.210 
(0.064) (0.105) (0.102) (0.099) (0.068) (0.046)
Rm
0.493 0.217 0.422 0.510 –0.456 1.190 
(0.316) (0.408) (0.412) (0.412) (0.281) (0.336)
Rr
–0.275 –0.342 –0.443 –0.631 0.180 –1.510 
(0.188) (0.209) (0.217) (0.219) (0.206) (0.373)
Dp
–0.790 0.181 0.124 –0.054 — –0.539 
(0.152) (0.173) (0.164) (0.159) — 0.276
Constant
0.594 — — — — 0.594
(0.678) — — — — (0.678)
Trend
0.0010 — — — — 0.0010
(0.0005) — — — — (0.0005)
T = 1975/I–1994/IV, R2 = 0.99, s ˆ = 0.45 percent, DW =1.99, 
AR: F(5, 45) = 2.31, ARCH: F(4, 42) = 0.25, 
Normality: c2(2) = 3.84, RESET F(1, 49) = 2.98.
Note: 1. The figures in the parentheses are standard errors for coefficients.estimators give slightly different coefficients (they are rather similar to those of the
unrestricted cointegrating vector in Table 2) such as
m – pt = 0.67yt + 0.31wt + 1.19Rmt – 1.46Rrt + 0.003trend – 0.81, (3)
(0.14)    (0.03)     (0.42)       (0.37)      (0.001)         (1.70)
the test statistics confirm the stability of the relation. That is, Lc = 0.29, MeanF =
5.02, SupF = 21.70, where Lc and MeanF capture a gradual shift that follows some
Martingale process and SupF is against a one-time break. None of them rejects 
the null hypothesis of no shift at the 5 percent significance level of his simulated
critical values.
13
Since we have a reliable long-run solution, the next step is to reduce the model to
a more parsimonious one. Imposing the restriction on the coefficients of yt and wt as
0.4, we have the following result.
D(m – p)t = –0.30(m – p – 0.4y – 0.4w)t–1+ 0.65Rmt–1 – 0.75Rrt–1
(0.05)                                     (0.13)          (0.12)
+ 0.0008trend + 0.40MDyt–1 + 0.18Dwt – 0.44EDpt (4) (0.0002)         (0.14)            (0.05)       (0.08)
+ 0.55DRmt + 0.51,
(0.16)          (0.08)
T = 1975/I–1994/IV, R
2 = 0.79, s ˆ = 0.49 percent, DW = 2.05,
AR: F(5, 66) = 0.96, ARCH: F(4, 63) = 0.06, Normality: c
2(2) = 1.05, 
Xi
2: F(16, 54) = 0.60, XiXj: F(44, 26) = 0.74, RESET F(1, 70) = 2.44.
Here MDyt is a two-quarter moving average (S
1
i=0Dyt–i), and EDpt is the data-
based expectation of inflation (Dpt + D
2pt) à la Hendry (1995). XiXj is another type
of White heteroscedasticity test. The signs of the coefficients allow for the ordinary
interpretation. The estimated model retains the features of the original model. For
example, the solved static solution of the model (putting zero to the D terms and
ignoring a constant) is 
m – p = 0.4y + 0.4w + 2.19Rm – 2.54Rr + 0.003trend, (5)
and is almost identical to equations (1) and (2). In fact, a test to see whether the
parsimonious model encompasses the ADL model gives the result 1.71, which
follows  F(21, 50) and is accepted.
Next, we test the stability of this model. In Figure 5, a forecast test of
1989/I–1994/IV, which covers the peak and the subsequent bursting of the bubble, is
reported. Although the model fails to forecast the actual outcome on 1990/II, it
reasonably succeeds in forecasting the rest of the period. The “forecast” Chow test,
which tests the equality between coefficients obtained from the pre-forecast interval
and those from the forecast interval, is 1.25 ~ F(22, 49) and is not rejected. Then,
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the stability of the model in the form of recursive tests of
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13. The FM regression and the Hansen test are calculated by COINT 2.0 on GAUSS. Automatic bandwidth is used.47
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Figure 5  Forecast Test
Figure 6  Recursively Estimated Chow Tests
Figure 7  Recursively Estimated Coefficientsthe model. First, in Figure 6, the recursively estimated Chow tests are reasonably
below their 5 percent critical values. Furthermore, in Figure 7, recursively estimated
coefficients are plotted with their standard errors. In fact, almost all parameters show
some fluctuations around 1990. However, these fluctuations are within bands of
standard errors through the 1980s. For this reason, we may conclude that these
parameters are reasonably stable.
14
In sum, all of the evidence suggests that an appropriately modeled demand
function is still stable even after financial liberalization and the bubble, which were
believed to make it unstable.
C. Exogeneity Test
In order to confirm the validity of the above model, we further test the exogeneity
status of two contemporaneous variables of interest, the inflation rate and the own
interest rate.
15 The test applied below is a test for super exogeneity proposed by Engle
and Hendry (1993).
According to Engle, Hendry, and Richard (1983), super exogeneity is defined as
follows.
16 If the data generation process (DGP) can be expressed as a joint density, it
can be factorized as
DX(mt, ztçXt–1, q) = DMçZ(mtçzt, Xt–1, f1)•DZ(ztçXt–1, f2), (6)
where X' t = (mt, zt). In this form, zt is super exogenous for y (the parameters of
interest), if
[1] it is weakly exogenous for y; and
[2] f1 is invariant to a change in f2, i.e., ¶f1/¶f2= 0.
The former is the condition that enables us to obtain all the necessary informa-
tion for efficient estimates of the parameters of interest from the conditional model
DMçZ(mtçzt, Xt–1, f1) alone. For this reason, this can be said to be one of the minimum
requirements for the regression model, because we derive the linear regression model
from the conditional model by approximating it to the normal distribution through
adequate data transformation. That is,
DMçZ(mtçzt, Xt–1, f1) »NMçZ(mt*çzt*, X* t–1, f1 *), (7)
where mt* = hm(mt), zt* = hz(zt). More formally, the weak exogeneity condition is
written as
[1] y = f (f1) alone, i.e., y does not depend on f2; and
[2] f1 and f2 are variation free, i.e., F1 ¹ g(f2), where F1 is the parameter space of f1.
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14. Parameter stability of EDp and DRmt will be further tested by the super exogeneity test in the next section.
15. In an error correction model, there are two types of parameters whose exogeneity conditions should be checked.
One is long-run parameters, i.e., coefficients of error correction terms, and the other is short-run parameters, 
i.e., coefficients of contemporaneous variables in D form. The former can be tested by a restriction test on the
adjustment coefficient, as we did in a system analysis of cointegration. On the other hand, the super exogeneity
test discussed below is an exogeneity test for short-run parameters. As Urbain (1992) summarized, required
exogeneity conditions differ depending on which parameters are of interest to researchers.
16. Other than cited here, see chapter 5 of Hendry (1995) and Ericsson (1992) for various concepts of exogeneity.On the other hand, the latter condition claims that the parameters of interest
remain constant when the process of generating zt, the marginal modelDZ(ztçXt–1, f2)
in equation (6), changes. For example, if zt is generated by a policy rule, variance of
the marginal process is brought about by a policy intervention. Although no one seri-
ously believes that a model describing an economic phenomenon would be absolutely
robust for any change in an input, there may be robustness for a certain class of input
changes including some policy interventions.
Putting the above two conditions together, super exogeneity enables us to conduct
policy analysis or simulation. This is because, regarding zt as policy instruments,
from the first condition we can derive the parameters of interest y by regression, and
from the second condition we can simulate the change in policy rule—say, zT+1 ®
z'T+1 as yz'T+1—since y does not change as a result of the policy intervention.
In addition, there is an important derivation here. Engle and Hendry (1993)
prove that if zt is super exogenous for y in the conditional model, the reverse cannot
happen, that is, mt cannot be super exogenous in a simple reverse model (zt is
regressed on mt). Intuitively their proof implies that when zt is super exogenous, the
reverse model cannot be constant. For example, in our framework, if the inflation
rate is super exogenous in a money demand function, we cannot have a constant
inflation function by means of simply reversing that money demand function.
Meanwhile, as for a test for super exogeneity, Engle and Hendry check both weak
exogeneity and parameter invariance as follows. If (mt, zt) ' follow jointly a linear












In this case, it can be shown that a conditional distribution (equation [7]) is
expressed as
DMçZ(mtçzt, Xt–1, f1) »N [btzt + Xt–1g +(dt – bt)(zt – mt
Z), wt], (9)
where dt = st
MZ/st
ZZ. Weak exogeneity with respect to bt implies that dt = bt, since in
this case, we can see that DMçZ(.) does not include any parameter of DZ. Moreover,
parameter invariance can be tested as follows. Using a Taylor Series approximation,







Parameter invariance means that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0. In other words, the test corre-
sponds to the test of the null coefficient of zt – mt
Z and st
ZZ, which are added to the
original regression model of mt = bzt + Xt–1g.
17
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17. Frequently, terms of higher order, (mt
Z)2 and mt
Zst
ZZ, are not added because they take quite small values and are
insignificantly different from zero.In practice, as proxies for the unobservable values zt – mt
Z and st
ZZ, Engle and
Hendry used ordinary least square (OLS) estimated errors, u ˆt, and a moving average
of u ˆt
2, s ˆt, which are derived from the marginal model of zt,
k
zt = åbizt–i+ ut.
i=0
Following a procedure similar to Engle and Hendry, first, we try to model the
univariate marginal processes of the inflation rate and the own interest rate.
∆ pt = 0.27∆ pt–2 – 0.16∆ pt–3 – 0.21∆ pt–4 – 0.04pt–1 + 0.003, (11)
(0.10)        (0.09)        (0.08)        (0.005)   (0.00078)
T = 1975/I–1994/IV, R
2 = 0.54, s ˆ = 0.45 percent, DW = 1.48,
AR: F(5, 70) = 2.28, ARCH: F(4, 67) = 0.55, Normality: c
2(2) = 2.42,
Xi
2: F(8, 66) = 0.91, XiXj: F(14, 60) = 0.75, RESET F(1, 74) = 3.70.
∆ Rmt = 0.51∆ Rmt–1 + 0.22∆ Rmt–3 – 0.12Rmt–1 + 0.012ID80/II





–5)         (0.003)
T = 1975/I–1994/IV, R
2 = 0.54, s ˆ = 0.28 percent, DW = 1.88,
AR: F(5, 69) = 0.78, ARCH: F(4, 66) = 1.45, Normality: c
2(2) = 4.73,
Xi
2: F(9, 64) = 0.89, XiXj: F(15, 58) = 0.75, RESET F(1, 73) = 0.008.
From these equations, u ˆ(.) t and  s ˆ(.)t, which is calculated as the four-period
moving average of u ˆ2(.)t, are obtained. A super exogeneity test is conducted by
including these terms together. The obtained result is
∆ (m – p)t = –0.29(m – p – 0.4y – 0.4w)t–1 + 0.65Rmt–1 – 0.71Rrt–1
(0.06)                                     (0.16)          (0.16)
+ 0.0009trend + 0.39M∆ yt–1 + 0.18∆ wt – 0.21E∆ pt
(0.0002)         (0.17)            (0.06)       (0.19) (13) + 0.62∆ Rmt + 0.49 – 0.005u ˆ(∆ p)t – 0.003s ˆ(∆ p)t
(0.26)          (0.09) (0.003)           (0.003)
– 0.002u ˆ(∆ Rm)t + 0.001s ˆ(∆ Rm)t,
(0.005)              (0.011)
T = 1975/IV–1994/IV, R
2 = 0.79, s ˆ = 0.50 percent, DW = 2.07,
AR: F(5, 59) = 1.32, ARCH: F(4, 56) = 0.13, Normality: c
2(2) = 1.73,
Xi
2: F(24, 39) = 0.54, RESET F(1, 63) = 6.03*.
None of the additional terms is significant. In fact, the linear restriction tests 
for zero coefficients of the additional terms is 0.65 ~F(6, 64), which is well below 
its 5 percent critical value. Furthermore, if each pair of u ˆ(.) t and s ˆ(.)t is added
individually, the results are the same, i.e., none of the added terms is significant. 
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to the additional terms and distributes as F(2, 66). From them, we may conclude
that these terms are super exogenous in the money demand function.
V. Conclusion
Despite the “boom and bust” of the “bubble” economy, the paper shows that the
underlying demand for money has been stable, if we properly take into account
financial liberalization and the wealth effect. At this moment, Japan is experiencing
another big wave of financial liberalization, the financial “Big Bang” reform, which 
is scheduled to be completed by 2001. The reform might require researchers to
reconsider the above specification of money demand in the future. For example, 
the amendment of the Foreign Exchange Law, effective from April 1998, is likely 
to make the money demand more sensitive to movements in the exchange rate.
18
How to incorporate the impacts of the ongoing financial reform is an item on the
agenda of future research.
Furthermore, the paper reveals that the function satisfies the super exogeneity
condition with respect to the inflation rate and the money’s own interest rate. The
latter implies that money demand can be controlled by the central bank, if it can
deliberately alter the own interest rate. This is because super exogeneity claims that
such policy intervention has been effective in the sense that the parameter used for
policy simulation is invariant (see Favero and Hendry [1992] for the issue related to
the Lucas critique). On the other hand, the former implies that we cannot obtain an
inflation function by means of a simple inversion of the money demand. Because of
super exogeneity, this function loses parameter constancy. While money may have
some information content that permits predicting future inflation rates (Sekine
[1996]), its transmission mechanism is far more complex than a simple inversion of
the money demand. In order to clarify the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, we have to look at an inflation function together with the demand for money
and other structural equations. An extension of Hendry and Mizon (1993) of the
“general-to-simple” approach in the context of a simultaneous equations model seems
to be one of the more promising candidates for this.
51
Financial Liberalization, the Wealth Effect, and the Demand for Broad Money in Japan
Additional terms
u ˆ(∆ p) u ˆ(∆ Rm)
s ˆ(∆ p) s ˆ(∆ Rm)
Test statistics 1.12 0.09
18. A preliminary investigation has not confirmed any significant role of the exchange rate in the above money
demand function. As Ishida and Shirakawa (1996) emphasized, this is probably because of the past regulation
that prohibited Japanese residents from maintaining overseas deposits.APPENDIX: INTERPOLATION OF WEALTH DATA
The annual SNA-based wealth data are interpolated into quarterly data. This
appendix describes the procedure. All data used here are evaluated at current prices.
SNA wealth data can be decomposed into five components. These are 
[1] inventory;
[2]  net fixed assets; buildings for residence and nonresidence, machinery, etc.;
[3] non-reproducible tangible assets; lands, forest, etc.;
[4] financial assets other than stocks; currency, deposits, bonds, etc.; and 
[5] stocks.
The interpolation is conducted individually into each component.
A. Inventory
Quarterly based changes in inventories (private and public sectors) are cumulated to
the stock of inventory at the end of 1955. However, because of estimation error, the
cumulated series does not coincide with the stock data, which are available at the end
of each year. Then, the quarterly based stock of inventory is obtained by putting the
cumulated series into x* in the following equation:
Tx x** t+i  = x ¯ t+i + —(x ¯* t+i – x* t+i)i, (A.1)
Tx*
wherei = 1, 2, 3 and denotes the i-th quarter of each year. Over-bar denotes the lin-
ear interpolation and Tx = (xt– xt–4)/4, Tx* = (xt*– x* t–4)/4. The equation comes from
interpolation by related series in the textbook by Maddala (1977, pp. 205–207).
B. Net Fixed Assets
The related series—x* in equation (A.1)—is obtained by cumulating quarterly net invest-
ment (private housing investment + private business investment + public investment –
depreciation) to the stock of net fixed assets at the end of 1955. Then, similar to
inventory, the quarterly based net fixed assets are derived from equation (A.1).
C. Non-Reproducible Tangible Assets
First, the quarterly land price index is calculated by linearly interpolating the ratio of
(land price index)/(nominal GDP), where the land price index (urban district, all
purpose, six major cities) comprises biannual data. Next, the annual SNA data are
divided by the corresponding land price index and the result is linearly interpolated
into the quarterly data. Then, the quarterly series of non-reproducible tangible assets
is obtained by multiplying these two quarterly sets of data.
D. Financial Assets Other than Stocks
The FOF statistics provide information on quarterly basis financial assets other than
stocks. However, because of some discrepancies in bond valuation, the series does 
not coincide with the corresponding SNA data. Here, the quarterly SNA-based
financial assets other than stocks are calculated by linearly interpolating the ratio of
(FOF-based series)/(SNA-based series).
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There are differences in treatment between SNA and FOF. These are
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SNA FOF
Nonfinancial sector
Book values up to 1968,  Book values up to 1982/IV, 
market values after 1969. market values after 1983/I.
Financial sector
Book values up to 1968,  Book values up to 1994/IV, 
market values after 1969. market values after 1995/I.
Our estimation is conducted for sample periods after 1975, hence SNA-based
stock assets are valued at market prices. First, quarterly stocks held by the nonfinan-
cial sector are calculated by linearly interpolating the ratio of (FOF nonfinancial
stock)/(SNA nonfinancial stock). Although there is a change in valuation of 
FOF-based stock, I cannot find an apparent shift in the ratio. For this reason, such a
shift in valuation is neglected in the interpolation.
Next, for stocks held by the financial sector before 1995, linear interpolation is
conducted to the ratio of (FOF financial stock) to (SNA financial stock), both on a
book value basis. Then, the ratio of (market values in SNA)/(book values in SNA) is
linearly interpolated. The market value of quarterly stocks held by the financial sector
is obtained by multiplying the interpolated book value of stock and the interpolated
ratio of (market values in SNA)/(book values in SNA).
19
19. Since both statistics value the stock at market prices after 1995, quarterly stocks held by the financial sector can
be calculated simply by linear interpolation of the ratio (FOF financial stock)/(SNA financial stock), both on a
market price basis. However, because of substantial revisions of the preliminary data in SNA—only preliminary
data were available when I started this study—I decided not to use the data after 1995/I and conducted all the
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